Part Three
The Ethnic Germans of Hungary
in the Waffen-SS
Translated by
Henry A. Fischer
The source of the information found in this article is taken
from Henry's translation and summarization of major portions of
Die Ungardeutshen in Der Waffen-SS
by
Johann
Böhm
published by
the Verlag des Arbeitskreises für Geschichte und Kultur
der deutschen Siedlungsgebiete im Südosten Europas e.V.
in Ippesheim 1990.
The occupation of
Denmark and Norway on June 17th and the French surrender on June 22nd
led to reconciliation between the Bund and the Arrow Cross Party in light of
the German victories. Basch reported, “To all intents and purposes Hungary could
easily be brought under the influence of Germany if a government came into place that
could fulfill the interests of the Reich.” The Arrow Cross member of parliament, Pál
Vágo speaking at the party national conference said that in light of the present
political situation an unexpected and surprise takeover of Hungary was possible for
their party. With a change in the political situation, Szalasi, the leader of the
Fascist Arrow Cross would form a new government with Nazi Germany’s assistance and as
a result would develop a programme to regulate the autonomy of the German Folk Group
and the other minorities, which is the proposal they presented to the Hungarian
parliament on June 7, 1940. The next day the Hungarian press unleashed a scathing
criticism of the Arrow Cross proposals. Among the provisions of the proposal were
items including the non-interference of the Hungarian state in the affairs of the
minority associations; the leadership of the groups would be determined by its members
and not appointed by the state; the minorities would elect and send their own
representatives to parliament; oversight of the minorities would be the responsibility
of the Minister of Minorities; the mother tongue would be the language of instruction
in the schools of the minorities.
The reaction of
the Hungarian government was prompt: a resounding repudiation of it. The VOMI also
distanced itself from the declaration of the Arrow Cross because they believed they
could not be trusted and would still work towards the assimilation of the ethnic
German minority nonetheless. After all, they reasoned they were Hungarians. In an
attempt to pacify Basch and his cronies, Teleki removed “all anti-German officials at
all levels of government.” He also put a stop to the forced Magyarization of German
family names. He indicated that the status of the ethnic German minority had to be
up-graded in light of the hope for revision of the territory of Transylvania to
reflect the rights and social status of the Transylvania Saxon population that lived
there. This change on Teleki’s part was due to the Reich’s support for the return to
Hungary of northern Transylvania from Romania. Because Hitler assured the Hungarians
of his support for their aspirations to reclaim their lost territories the Volksbund was allowed to establish itself across the country in local chapters and
village organizations. On July 5th Basch was asked to make a presentation
to the government Cabinet outlining the aspirations and wishes of the Volksbund.
He rhymed off a list of demands like: the full independence of the Bund in the areas
of the school question, its internal organization, Levente education, the military,
the press and the churches.
At discussions in
Munich on July 10th, Hitler informed Teleki and Csáky that Romania would
cede northern Transylvania to Hungary. He pointed out that he had faced much
opposition from the Transylvania Saxons against the possible Hungarian takeover in
which they were uninterested and just wanted to be left in peace. For supporting the
revisionist policy of Hungary he needed concessions from the Hungarians with regard to
the status and rights of the Transylvania Saxons. Teleki assured Hitler that it would
be taken into active consideration. After returning to Budapest Teleki took action to
permit the publication of the German weekly “Deutsche Zeitung” as a daily newspaper in
October of 1940 as a show of good faith.
Up until now,
Hungarian politicians had basically ignored Basch but he now found himself courted by
the right wing parties: Bela Imrédy, Count Imre Kalolyi and Andrew Tasnády. Basch
and his associates gained greater freedom in carrying out their political and cultural
activities. In their official speeches they expressed a new tone so that the
government was to understand that in the future they needed to be taken seriously and
could not longer be “run over” as Basch put it.
At the general
assembly of the Volksbund in Hidas, Baranya County on August 11, 1940 Basch was
outspoken in the demands he made of the Hungarian government in an address he
delivered that called for the replacement of all non-Germans serving as notaries and
teachers in ethnic German communities and called for their prompt dismissal. He
further stated that all of the ethnic German settlement areas of Hungary be placed
under the jurisdiction of the Volksbund. Despite of the Bund’s
attempt
to create a division between the ethnic German minority and the Magyars, the vast
majority of the Swabian population acknowledged Hungary as their fatherland and the
wellbeing of all of its citizens was their ideal for the nation. Basch’s claim that
there was a strong movement within the Lutheran Church to separate on the basis of
nationality and form new Seniorats (Church Districts) was false as were most of his
attempts to divide the Churches. But the divisions between the Hungarian government
and the Volksbund and the German minority broadened and deteriorated with the
ever-increasing rapidity as their Nazi ideology became more and more apparent.
Basch was now
totally involved, engrossed and committed to the National Socialist ideology at this
point and made a public breakthrough on the occasion of addressing the upper echelons
of the Hungarian government at the dedicatory celebration opening the “German House”
in Budapest on August 18, 1940 which would serve as the headquarters of the Volksbund. He proceeded to ride his hobbyhorse of the suppression of the ethnic
German minority in a scalding address that left no room for doubt about his Nazi
orientation.
After the
occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Red Army in June 1940 and the
concentration of Russian troops on the Romanian frontier in August, Hitler intervened
personally in the Hungarian and Romanian discussions with regard to the territorial
issue of Transylvania. He let both parties understand they needed to work out an
agreement with regard to the ethnic German minority and that the Reich would provide
the guarantees for their rights and were prepared to defend them. Hitler wanted peace
and quiet in southeastern Europe as soon as possible and called for the Foreign
Ministers of Italy, Hungary and Romania to meet in Vienna on August 26, 1940.
An agreement was
finalized on August 30th after Ribbentrop used pressure tactics against the
Romanians and accepted some of their concessions. Teleki and Csáky represented
Hungary, Manoilescu represented Romania and Ciano represented Italy. The Germans and
the Italians called the shots. On September 4, 1940 Teleki announced the agreement in
parliament to the effect that Hungary had gained more than territory but were enriched
by a larger population that needed to feel at home in “Greater Hungary.” But not
everyone was satisfied. At the time of the signing of the Accord, during discussions
with Basch on August 30th Pál Vágo of the Arrow Cross vehemently gave
expression to his discontent over the support of the Volksbund for the Teleki
government. He felt the Volksbund was hindering the growth of the Hungarian
Nazis not strengthening the movement in any way. Basch let him understand that he had
no other real alternative than to support the official Reich policy towards the
Hungarian government. It was for that reason he told him that he was able to
establish a local organization in Budapest which had not been possible up until now.
The Arrow Cross official was not impressed.
With the
annexation of the new territories, between 43,000-61,000 Transylvania Saxons and
47,000-61,000 Szatmar Swabians were added to the ethnic German minority in Hungary.
The Saxons in northern Transylvania had their own economic and political
organizations, their own home grown intelligentsia and their own German schools and
high schools and they saw their task was to build up the ethnic German intelligentsia
and the organizational acumen of the Folk Group in Hungary.
Teleki’s approval
for the establishment and opening of a German high school in Budapest on August 25,
1940 hardly met the educational aspirations of the Volksbund. The teacher’s
colleges of the Saxons were to train a Swabian intelligentsia for all of greater
Hungary but most of the students came from the Batschka.
Nazi propaganda
intensified throughout the ethnic German communities in Hungary after the Second
Vienna Accord (August 1940). The reason behind that was that the Hungarian government
was obligated to allow the members of the Folk Group to fully express what they
considered were their “national” rights.
During Basch’s
visit to Berlin on September 12th he addressed several groups and
organizations and spoke glowingly about the opportunity for the Volksbund to
achieve its objectives in the light of the Accord. At the time he also had talks with
Heinrich Himmler. He apparently gave him instructions to establish youth, women,
cultural and economic associations among the ethnic German minority in Hungary based
on the model of such organizations in the Reich. In order for this to develop it
would require the strongest pressure from the Reich on Hungarian officialdom and both
Basch and Himmler were united in that opinion. Himmler urged Basch to carry out these
intensive activities among the Swabians to stabilize the position of the ethnic German
minority even though both of them knew that Teleki had already forbidden such
activities.
Even before the
forty-eight new members of parliament from Northern Transylvania took their places in
the Budapest parliament there were misunderstandings and sharp exchanges between
Teleki and Basch over who the two ethnic German representatives would be. Teleki
wanted to appoint Robert Clemens and Michael Proll to parliament while Basch made a
strong case for Dr. Eduard Keintzel as the representative of the Saxons and Sepp
Schönborn for the Szatmar Swabians. All four of them had fallen for Nazism at the
beginning of the 1930s. Basch was able to get Clemens and Proll to decline and his
two appointees entered parliament on October 10, 1940.
The diatribes and
hate filled speeches of Basch after the Second Vienna Accord directed against the
Hungarians lacked tact and diplomacy. On November 6th when he spoke in
Liptod in Baranya County he said, “From this day onwards if we are criticized by them
in word or deed I will spring for their throats!” Later on November 10th
in Pécsvárad he is reported to have said, “For us, the ethnic German people come first
and then comes a pile of manure, and then another pile of manure and only then come
the Hungarian leaders.” These rude and crude tactics only worsened relationships
between the Volksbund and the Hungarian government. But Basch believed that in
this way he could win those who were committed to maintaining their ethnic German
identity for his movement. To a great degree it proved successful.
At a conference
of teachers on the November 19th in which 112 teachers who were members of
the ethnic German minority in Hungary participated at Bistritz to discuss the
possibility of ethnic German schools in Hungary it became obvious that the Nazi
ideology espoused by many indicated they formed the majority of the leading
intellectuals. Great emphasis was placed on history, physical education, biology
(race) and music in order to create a new German people.
The desire to
establish an independent political party like those of the ethnic German minorities in
the neighbouring states was something Basch refused to give up. He had a stubborn
streak in this regard In his speeches he insisted emphatically on this point and
left no doubt that such a party would be dependent upon the ideology of the NSDAP in
Germany. This was an excerpt from a speech he gave in Mosonmagyaróvár, November 24,
1940.
Following the
Second Vienna Accords the leadership of the Volksbund energetically pushed the
Hungarian government to meet the requirements of the minorities’ agreement that were
part of the Accord. Teleki indicated in response that he considered the matter simply
an addendum to the Minutes and did not have the force of law. However, when the
Romanian government implemented the agreement related to the minorities on November
20, 1940 Teleki was forced to act. He indicated that the matter was under study and
he dragged his heels and tried to subvert the agreement as much as possible.
With the “return”
of southern Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine and northern Transylvania Hungary inherited a
ethnic German population that was conscious of its ethnic identity and had a German
school system in place and the Hungarian A, B, C types of schools could not be
implemented. On February 1, 1941 a new Minorities School Regulation was put into
effect and the Volksbund was successful in establishing some Type A schools.
(Up until 1944 the Volksbund ran seventeen such schools in the former territory
of Trianon Hungary. This included three high schools in Hidas, Deutschbol and Baja
and two junior colleges in Budapest and Pécs.) There was always a shortage of German
speaking teachers and teachers had to be recruited in Germany. But the Hungarian
government stepped in to curtail the programme and did not allow for the importation
of textbooks from Germany.
In the February
15, 1941 issue of the Deutsche Zeitung the Bund leadership
claimed that the Vienna Accord required that German be the language of instruction in
the schools of the ethnic German minority in Hungary. The question of the German
schools in Hungary could only be addressed under the terms of the Accord if the Volksbund
had the autonomy to oversee and administer them.
In the propaganda
speeches delivered by Bund activists in the ethnic German communities it was
intoned over and over again that the people had to acknowledge their German race and
nationality. There was always an underlying threat in these speeches to the effect
that those who denied or hid their ethnic German identity would suffer difficulties in
the future. On the other hand the Hungarian government and its supporters among the
ethnic German minority indicated that anyone who acknowledged being ethnic German in
the next government census would be resettled in Germany. Whoever registered as a
non-Hungarian would also have to be afraid of being looked upon as a traitor to the
nation and would be treated as such. It was also to have economic consequences and
the loss of property. The same threats were made to the assimilated Swabians as
well. There can be no talk of the freedom of choice in this matter, which was typical
of all of the entire Magyarization legislation and pressures exerted on the ethnic
German minority during this period.
The hostile
attitude of the Hungarian government towards its minorities was not limited to their
schools, language and culture but also had economic consequences. It was no wonder
that the minorities became radicalized and supported political parties and ideologies
that promised an improvement in their situation.
How disinterested
Teleki was in carrying out any talks with the ethnic German minority was exemplified
in the discussions he held with Brandt, Keintzel and Mühl the German members of
parliament on February 24, 1941. As the parliamentarians indicated the issues that
bothered the ethnic German minority about the way the census was being conducted he
indicated, “I’m afraid I have my own complaints about you. It appears that the ethnic
German Folk Group has forgotten where their loyalty lies.” When Keintzel brought up
the matter of the pre-military training of the ethnic German youth and indicated that
it should be turned over to the Volksbund and asked for permission to speak to
the Minister of Education about it, Teleki brought the audience to an abrupt halt and
left.
The
radicalization and intensification of opposing positions became more and more obvious
as the census approached. Leading members of the Volksbund spewed forth all
kinds of demagoguery in speaking to their membership. Franz Jankovich was reported to
have spoken in Szökéd in Baranya County on February 2, 1941 and said: “Our ethnic
German children do not have to know who Kossuth and Petöfi were. We are ethnic German
and ethnic German we will remain.”
It is no wonder
that the two campaigns split the ethnic German minority into two opposing factions.
Membership in the Volksbund increased from 53,000 in October 1940 to 97,000 in
the spring of 1941. These figures indicate that the majority of the Swabians and
other ethnic German minorities continued to support the Hungarian government. In
Tolna County a loyalty movement sprang up: Treu Zur Heimat
(Loyal to the Homeland). It came into existence to thwart the spread and influence of
the Volksbund. The adverse policies of the Hungarian government against the
ethnic German minority and the ongoing victories of the German Army led to an increase
in the Volksbund membership. The military power of Germany was overwhelming
and the Hungarian government was in no position to take reprisals against its ethnic
German population. This hesitancy on their part only encouraged the Bund
leadership in its Nazi policies and Basch and others became more combative in their
speeches to their followers.
The objective of
the Volksbund’s activities was to force Hungary to acknowledge that in terms of
the minorities’ agreement in the Accord the ethnic German Folk Group was in effect, “a
state within the state” which was totally untenable to the Hungarian government. When
Hungary joined the Axis Powers in the war against Russia the Hungarian government made
some concessions to the situation of the ethnic German minority in Hungary. But the
Reich would see to making some changes it had in mind as well.
The Chief of
Staff of the Hungarian Army, Henry Werth, was forced to resign on September 5, 1941
for his pro-German stance. This was seen as an unfriendly act on the part of Hungary
by the Volksbund and the Reich and antagonistic to Reich interests. The Reich
reacted by forming relationships with the right wing political parties to form an
opposition to the new government of Bárdossy who replaced Teleki. It did not take
long before the followers of Pállfys who “bought into” the whole Nazi bag along with
the Imrédy clique formed a new party: The National Socialist Party of Hungary. This
was a union of the right wing extremists that were prepared to assist the Reich to
pressure the Hungarian government to support their foreign policy objectives. But
even with all of these political machinations going on, Basch could not get beyond
being the Führer of an association that could not become a political party
unlike his confreres in Romania, Slovakia and Croatia.
In discussions
with Bárdossy, the new Prime Minister, on September 26, 1941 Basch was unable to get
approval for the formation of a youth organization under the auspices of the Volksbund because the same youth belonged to other state organizations that would
exclude participation in a Bund organization. The only exceptions to the law
were school and church groups. He pointed out that the Accord had permitted such
organizations on the part of the ethnic German Folk Group and Basch announced he would
proceed with the formation of a youth group. In light of the events in 1941, the
Hungarian government had no choice but to allow Basch to proceed but introduced some
conditions. A youth could only join if his father was a Volksbund member. All
members of the Bund youth organization also had to participate fully in the
local Levente unit and do four hours of training every week.
The ethnic German
Youth Organization was founded at the National Youth Day celebration in Magócs on June
19, 1941. In the next three months more than one hundred German youth went to Germany
at the invitation of the Reich Youth Leader, Arthur Axmann for a three month visit
which became a time for political indoctrination. Bárdossy became aware of it and was
enraged.
On September 26,
1941 Basch once again had talks with Bárdossy and raised the school issue again. For
Basch there were three important considerations: the language of instruction, the
“spirit” of education (by that he meant the Nazi ideology) and higher education. He
referred to Article I of the Vienna Accord in which Hungary had agreed not to curtail
in any way the full expression of the ethnic German Folk Group’s efforts to maintain
their ethnic identity. In Section D of Article I, he pointed out that ethnic German
children were assured of an education in their own language and under Section G
Hungary had guaranteed not to force the assimilation of the ethnic German minority in
any way. In passing Basch also criticized the School Regulation of February 1, 1941.
After these
discussions that were followed by some rather rash speeches on Basch’s part, Bádossy
called in the German ambassador von Jagow on October 27, 1941 to inform him he was
outraged by the tone and direction that Basch was taking. As an ally of the Reich
against the Bolsheviks he could not tolerate the anti-government agitation of Basch
and his henchmen in the Bund because it was self defeating and detrimental to
the war effort. He informed the ambassador to convey his concerns to Ribbentrop that
Basch was injuring German-Hungarian relations and he should desist from such practices
in the future in order to safeguard their alliance.
An angry von
Jagow called in Basch and laid down the law, which surprised both Basch and the
Foreign Office in Berlin, since von Jagow himself had set the course for Basch in the
first place. The recent dismissal of General Werth was also having an effect on the
Foreign Office at the time. But Bárdossy was taking other steps to curtail the
activities of the Volksbund. He informed the German Foreign Office he would
not longer tolerate Basch’s incendiary speeches and the charges he made against the
Hungarian State. He would be forced to undertake serious reprisals to put a stop to
these unseemly outbursts of Basch. He also indicated he had been informed that the
Volksbund leaders were planning to undertake economic warfare against the
Hungarian economy.
In a letter of
April 8, 9141 to the Foreign Office, the German ambassador von Jagow in Budapest
shared his assessment of the situation and indicated that the Prime Minister of
Hungary was a man of his word, they would have to wait to see if it would lead to
deeds for the ethnic German question could only be solved politically. He also
indicated that the Bund leadership was of a different mind about the matter.
The heavy
casualties suffered by the Waffen-SS caused Himmler to summon Basch to Berlin on
November 18, 1941 to inform him of the current problems in his relationship with the
Hungarian government. Himmler informed him that the military situation demanded that
there be a stable relationship and role for the Volksbund with the Hungarian
government. This was urgent because he had to compensate for the losses suffered by
the Waffen-SS with volunteers from among the ethnic German minority in Hungary who he
was to enlist. The need of the hour was a secession of the conflict between the
Volksbund and the Hungarian government and a stance of loyalty to Hungary on the
part of the ethnic German minority, which would be crucial to win Bárdossy’s
confidence.
On November 25th
Bárdossy was in Berlin in order to extend the time frame for the continuation of the
anti-Comitern Pact. As the Hungarian Prime Minister met with Ribbentrop he brought up
the matter of the leadership of the Volksbund for discussion. In turn the
German Foreign Minister sent him to Himmler. In his meeting with the Hungarian Prime
Minister, Himmler assured him that in future the Basch led Bund would work
harmoniously with the Hungarian government. In addition, he indicated that it was in
the best interests of the Hungarian government to allow the Volksbund to be in
charge of the ethnic German youth organization in Hungary because it was reservoir of
brave anti-Bolshevik soldiers of the future and should be allowed to carry out their
programme of training the young men for this purpose unhindered by any policies or
actions on the part of the Hungarian government. In his discussions, Himmler neither
mentioned specifically nor alluded to the planned SS action to recruit young men from
among the ethnic German minority to serve in their forces.
Himmler’s
assurances had the desired effect and a kind of truce went into effect when Bárdossy
returned to Budapest and made some minor concessions. The Volksbund leaders
now watched the relationship between Budapest and Berlin very closely to find
political leverage and opportunities to meet their long-term goals.
The Reich
government held back from instigating the recruitment for the Waffen-SS in Hungary up
to the end of 1941. All of this changed quickly in the New Year. The Bund
became fully engaged in the recruitment of volunteers to join the Waffen-SS as well as
collect supplies for the frontline troops: food and clothing as well as providing
them with their weapons all in the best interests of Nazi Germany. The Hungarian
government was forced to respect the wishes of Himmler in order to maintain friendly
relations with Hitler’s Germany. On receiving instructions from Himmler on November
18, 1941 Basch had proceeded with the Youth Organization involving young men from 18
and older and young women from 15 years and older as the first step in preparation for
the recruitment programme of volunteers for the Waffen-SS. The school, church and
parents had nothing to say about the participation of their youth. The National Youth
Fürhrer, Mathias Huber, on the official founding of the youth organization in January
1942 declared: “Every last one of our ethnic German youth must be committed to our
cause. To be a ethnic German is to be a soldier!” The plan to surrender the able
bodied youth of the ethnic German minority in Hungary to become canon fodder for the
Nazi war machine was now set in motion.
