The Ethnic Germans of Hungary
in the Waffen-SS
Translated by
Henry A. Fischer
The source of the information found in this article is taken
from Henry's translation and summarization of major portions of
Die Ungardeutshen in Der Waffen-SS
by
Johann
Böhm
published by
the Verlag des Arbeitskreises für Geschichte und Kultur
der deutschen Siedlungsgebiete im Südosten Europas e.V.
in Ippesheim 1990.
As a result of the Treaty of
Trianon which went into effect on June 4, 1920 the territory of Hungary was reduce
from 325,500 square kilometres to only 93,000. Large Hungarian minorities were left
in Transylvania, the Banat and Slovakia. The revision of this Treaty became the
platform of all of the political powers and parties of Hungary. During the time of
the Bethlen government (1921-1931) after putting down the Communist uprising the old
social order was restored and Hungary allied itself with Italy to further its
revisionist policies and objectives. In the midst of the Great Depression from
1932-1936, Gömbös, who then was Prime Minister instituted vigorous and authoritarian
reforms to further the revisionist agenda. In his foreign policy he allied Hungary
with Italy and Austria by co-signing the Roman Protocols and then began a similar
approach with the new National Socialist government of Germany in order to regain the
“lost territories.”
Gyula Gömbös was a fanatic Hungarian racist (Translator’s note:
This was despite the fact that his mother was a Danube Swabian from Murga in the Tolna
who never learned to speak Hungarian.) and as early as 1923 he was in touch wit the
fledgling Nazi movement in Bavaria. After Hitler’s takeover of the NSDAP, Gömbös
became interested in a close economic and political relationship between Germany and
Hungary.
For a start in establishing this new relationship, Hitler and
Gömbös began with bilateral trade and customs agreements in which the two nations were
given preference in terms of their exports and imports. But such cooperation at that
level left little hope for Hungary’s revisionist policies because it was not related
to their foreign policy and the territorial expansion that Hitler was envisioning,
especially in terms of Czechoslovakia. As a result a Hungarian offer of a
Consultation Pact with the Reich Foreign Ministry was turned down as outside of
Germany’s primary interests. The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Neurath,
assured the Hungarians that the Reich supported their revisionist aspirations but that
Germany would have to deal with various states in Central Europe on their own to
further their own more pressing objectives.
One clear indication of that was Hermann Göring’s attendance at
the coronation of King Alexander in Belgrade in 1934 that was a sign that the Reich’s
best interests would be served through a good relationship with Yugoslavia. Since he
was in the vicinity he also called on King Carol II of Romania assuring him that the
Nazi government would support him in the face of any Hungarian revisionist aspirations
in reclaiming territory lost after the war. These official pronouncements of Göring
were critical of Hungary’s minorities’ policies and alarmed and infuriated the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry but did not lead to any kind of action. This simply
re-enforced the mistrust felt towards Nazi Germany by both the Hungarian Foreign
Minister Kalman Kanyá and the Regent Nicolas Horthy. This led to a serious dispute
between Hungary and Germany in mid November 1934 that culminated in a rift between the
Hungarian ambassador Maiservich in Berlin and the Reich Foreign Minister von Neurath.
As a result the Hungarian government was forced to recall their ambassador and
replaced him with the pro-German Sztojáy.
Even though Germany was interested in better relations with
Romania they declined to sign an economic treaty at the end of March in 1935 due to
what they called a lack of a positive political climate. But Titulescu mistrusted the
plan put forward by the Reich government because of its similarity to the pact between
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union of 1935 that was intended to include Romania but
was declined because Romania was not prepared to have any agreements with the USSR.
This led the Nazi leadership to look elsewhere to further its foreign policy ambitions
and attempted to warm up its cool relationship with Hungary. At the same, Regent
Horthy and his Prime Minister Gömbös, were looking towards Germany as a possible ally
to meet their own objectives. Hitler welcomed their overtures at a time when Britain,
France and Italy united to oppose Nazi policies in Europe. This diplomatic
manoeuvring followed Hitler’s rescinding of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles by
increasing the size of his army in March 1935. In the face of this attempt to isolate
Germany, Hitler wrote a personal letter to Horthy on May 13, 1935 emphasizing the
independence and integrity of both states and the common interests that they shared.
Shortly after, Göring visited Budapest and in September the Prime Minister Gömbös made
a state visit to Germany. There is no record of the discussions that took place on
September 29, 1935 between him and Hitler at his lair at Berechtsgarden in the
Bavarian Alps.
One of the results of the discussions was an arms deal which was
to the benefit of Hungary. This arms deal revived the revisionist hopes of Hungary,
while on the part of Germany it was simply a “cautious” attempt at an alliance at this
point.
When Italy invaded Ethiopia 1935-1936 an open conflict between
Mussolini and France broke out which at the same time was a serious blow to the League
of Nations. Germany’s support of Italy led to a bettering of relationships between
the two Dictators. With laying down the groundwork for the Rome/Berlin Axis there was
little room for Hungary to play its revisionist games if they were not in cinque with
the Axis Powers. Horthy called for discussions to determine and be informed of German
political plans and foreign policies for the future. He wrote Hitler a memorandum
outlining a proposed “Little Entente” for his consideration. Horthy inferred that he
could just as easily achieve military preparedness to achieve his revisionist goals
with the help of the Western Powers although he preferred to carry out his policies in
concert with Germany. The Regent’s memorandum outlined the possibility of a surprise
invasion of Czechoslovakia. He asked for Hitler’s commitment to the plan. There is
no record of the discussions that took place between Horthy and Hitler at
Berechtsgarden, nor the decision that was made. It is obvious Hitler held back from
backing Horthy’s plan while Horthy ordered that in the future Hungary would now
concentrate all of its efforts on the issues related to Czechoslovakia and would not
retreat from Hungary’s revisionist statements and declarations. Meanwhile, Germany
focussed on developing closer relationships with Romania and Yugoslavia. Official
relations between Hungary and Germany cooled throughout 1937.
Gömbös died in October 1936 and Kalman Daranyi became the new
Prime Minister, a much weaker politician than his predecessor so that foreign policy
was in the hands of the Foreign Minister Kanyá. No less upsetting were the increasing
activities of the Nazi group working among the Germans of Hungary under the leadership
of Franz Basch as well as the foreign affairs division of the NSDAP. Kanyá sought to
make a stronger case for Hungary’s position with the Western Powers while seeking a
compromise with the Little Entente. This was only possible with the support of the
government in Prague which was not feasible, nor was a separate treaty with Yugoslavia
and Romania. This political poker game caught the attention of von Neurath in Germany
who came to Budapest in June 1936 as Hungary prepared to sign a non-aggression pact
with the three states that was not really to their liking but all they could achieve.
Daranyi and Kanyá had journeyed to Germany for talks with Göring,
Hitler and von Neurath on November 22-25 in 1935 who were suspicious and mistrusted
the discussions Hungary was having with the members of the Little Entente. The
Hungarians learned unofficially about the coming annexation of Austria to the Reich
and the intensive actions the Nazis planned to take against Czechoslovakia. In return
for their support in what they planned to do in Czechoslovakia the Hungarians asked
for a free hand in dealing with Yugoslavia in attempt at regaining their lost
territories. They refused to grant it because of their own plans for Yugoslavia.
On March 12, 1938 when Göring informed the Hungarian ambassador,
Sztojáy, of the imminent annexation of Austria by German troops he is reported to have
said, “But when will it be Czechoslovakia’s turn?” With the occupation of Austria,
Hungary and Germany had become next door neighbours. Now it would be possible for the
Nazis to exert more influence throughout south-eastern Europe. In the past the
relationships between Hungary and Germany hinged on their political interactions, with
the annexation of Austria that would now change. The former uncoordinated efforts of
various levels of the Nazi Party towards the German minority in Hungary would now have
a different focus and dimension. The Reich Foreign Minister Frick spoke to the
Hungarian ambassador Sztojáy about Germany’s concerns about “the problem” of the
German minority on May 5, 1938. He asked the rhetorical question it if it would not
be better to recognize the Volks Bund established by Gratz, Basch and Huss the
official representative and spokesmen for the German minority in Hungary. This was
the same basic tactic that would be used by the Nazis in Czechoslovakia in terms of
the Sudeten Germans. The German minorities were simply to be used as an instrument of
Nazi foreign policy and from the outset the Hungarian government officials saw the
danger of them being used as a Fifth Column to carry out Hitler’s objectives.
In a discussion in Budapest between the German ambassador to
Hungary, Erdmannsdorf and Bela Imrédy the future Prime Minister on May 13, 1938 the
Hungarian asserted that there were parameters set with regard to the question of the
German minority that Professor Huss had overreached so that the idea that Frick had
proposed was not possible. These talks became very heated. Through the growing
strength of the right wing parties, foreign and domestic policies were all under
pressure and resulted in Imrédy replacing Daranyi. The resignation of Darnayi is
closely related to the activity of the Führer of the fanatically anti-Semitic
Arrow Cross Party, Ferenc Szalasi who Horthy saw as a dangerous opponent who would be
hard to control. These responses to growing German power show the effects on both the
foreign and domestic policies of Hungary as well as all of south-eastern Europe.
Despite that, Hungary was able to maintain an independent foreign policy in the face
of Nazi hegemony in Central Europe up until the Munich Agreement, September 29, 1938.
It is also important to recognize and note that Imrédy attempted to remove Gustav
Gratz from the leadership of the German minority in Hungary. Nor was he prepared to
call or rely upon the factional group headed by Basch and Huss who were waiting in the
wings.
Although Hungary had long been in the anti-Prague camp, Budapest
was not prepared to proceed without some guarantees from Hitler. In the months and
weeks before the Munich Pact the Nazi leadership pushed the Hungarian government to
make active preparations against Czechoslovakia. Hungary would have preferred to
accomplish their revisionist aims diplomatically. Hitler assured Hungarian
representatives he was sceptical of such an outcome in September 1938. Hungary wanted
to avoid the risk of war. Munich gave Hitler a green light to infiltrate all of
south-eastern Europe. Winston Churchill predicted that the Munich Pact left the way
open for Hitler to take Danubia all the way to the Black Sea in the British Parliament
on October 5, 1938. No one in Central Europe could now stand in Hitler’s way.
The political situation in south-eastern Europe changed
overnight. Hungary no longer saw chance for territorial expansion. With the
annexation of the Sudeten territories to the Reich in 1938, German designs on the rest
of Czechoslovakia became obvious. With the assistance of Hungary, Germany would
whittle Czechoslovakia down to size. German diplomacy was based on the fact that
Hungary was interested in absorbing the Carpatho-Urkaine now part of Czechoslovakia.
Hungary would share a common frontier with Poland with whom Hungary had friendly
relations even to the extent of sharing a common strategy of containment in terms of
Germany. Germany declined to take over the area in October 1938 so that its future
was left open. The tactic of holding back or occupying the area on the part of the
Reich had its desired effect. Representatives from Czechoslovakia met with the
Hungarians at Komárom later in October 1938 and rejected Hungarian claims to the area
which led to highly emotional reaction on the part of the government in Budapest. The
discussions at Komárom were broken off by Imrédy and Horthy and Horthy ordered the
mobilization of the army. At the same time, the former Prime Minister Daranyi was
dispatched to Munich to confer with Hitler. He was castigated by Hitler for Hungary’s
reluctance to comply shortly before the Munich Pact was signed. Hitler counselled the
Hungarians to hold back from military intervention in “rump” Czechoslovakia and be
satisfied to pursue their other revisionist claims. Hitler, however, took up the
matter of the Hungarian offer to join the anti-Commitern Pact but bypass it and leave
the League of Nations. During these talks the idea of a German-Polish-Hungarian Bloc
was spoken of by Hitler for the first time. This idea of forming such a Bloc played
an important role in the relationship between Germany and Poland in the winter of
1938-1939. That was Hitler’s way of saying that without German political support
Hungary’s territorial expansion was impossible.
The First of the Vienna Accords of November 2, 1938 that the Axis
Powers imposed granted Hungary only southern Slovakia even though they clambered for
the Carpatho-Ukraine. In spite of this only partial fulfillment of Hungary’s
territorial ambitions, Darnayi committed Hungary to closer relationships with the Axis
Powers and offered them Hungary’s support on instructions from Imrédy. At this point
the Hungarian cabinet had to rely more and more on the support of the right wing
political parties. Horthy was unable to hold back the power of the right wing groups
and the Nazi extremists among them. Imrédy continued to attempt to reach the goal of
the annexation of the Carpatho-Ukraine with the support of the Axis Powers. Hungary
planned such a move with full Polish support which Germany, however, opposed.
Berlin’s prevention of carrying out the goal led to a deep political crisis in
Hungarian government circles. The Hungarians finally faced the fact that without
German support they were impotent.
During talks on January 16, 1939 with Hitler and Ribbentrop, the
new Hungarian Foreign Minister, Csáky who replaced Kanyá, was confronted by Hitler who
upbraided him and threw Hungary’s ungratefulness and lack of reliability into his
face. Csáky concurred that Hungary could only achieve its goals in concert with
Germany and that without the Reich they were unable to do so. He assured the Nazi
leaders that Hungary would quit the League of Nations and was prepared to reconsider
its relationship with the German minority in Hungary. In addition they agreed upon an
ideological common approach to the Jewish question. These machinations on the part of
Hungary were the result of Versailles and the Western Powers need to acknowledge their
own responsibility for setting the scene for the Second World War. Each successive
Hungarian government after 1920 was compelled by the electorate to win back the lost
territories and from their perspective any method would do.
Shortly after the Munich Pact, Horthy acknowledged his dependence
on Germany would also lead to some rather slippery domestic politics. His room for
action became narrower and narrower while German interests became more and more
paramount. The Western Powers saw the fascist, anti-Semitic and Nazi tendencies of
the groups around Horthy gain ascendancy. The government had to deal with these new
political developments. Imrédy from the time he took office recognized that it was no
longer possible to hold these forces back. As a result he formed an
autocratic-half-fascist course for his government. By including, the anti-Semite
Jaross into the cabinet signalled Hitler that Hungary was prepared to accept the new
political order in Europe. Hitler could build on Budapest’s ongoing support. At the
insistence of Jaross the government instituted a repressive Jewish law in January 1939
and the creation of a uniformed fascist movement. This was opposed by Horthy and the
opposition parties. Horthy had failed to realize how much the influence of Nazi
Germany affected the affairs of Hungary. He gave evidence of his naivety when he
removed the autocratic Imrédy from office in February 1939. His successor Pal Teleki
in whom Horthy set his hopes to develop new polices and stances with the powers that
be in Berlin proved fruitless. Instead, the right wing became more radical in Hungary
and much stronger.
The annexation of Austria (1938); the occupation of Bohemia and
Moravia (1939); and the establishment of a satellite state of Slovakia were all signs
of Nazi ambitions in south-eastern Europe. The south-east was Hitler’s field of
action and there was no doubt of that in London, Paris and Rome.
As a result of gathering German strength, Mussolini sought to
intensify Italian and Hungarian relations. He informed representatives from Hungary,
Csáky and Teleki during discussions on April 18-20 1939 that every German power play
directed against Hungary would mean the end of the Axis Pact. Mussolini did not trust
Hitler and relations between them cooled. The joint efforts of Hungary and Italy were
centred on strengthening their ties with Yugoslavia in order to create a balance of
power against Germany. This would also put a check on Romania’s aspirations.
Mussolini, however, would switch sides when it was to his better advantage and sided
with Hitler.
Hungary still had its eye on Transylvania which was the basic
point of tension with Romania. In April 1939 Teleki let it be understood that if
there was a Polish-German military conflict Hungary would be neutral. Despite bribes
and pressures Hungary retained its neutrality. At the time that Hungary occupied the
Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939 Horthy personally thanked Hitler for his consent to Hungary’s
action. This had the effect of strengthening Budapest’s resolve to retake the
territories lost to Romania.
Teleki took Hungary out of the League of Nations on April 11,
1939 and sided with the Axis Powers even though the Western Powers had approached
Hungary offering a treaty to protect and defend south-eastern Europe. Romania feared
the loss of Transylvania and accepted the British-French guarantees to preserve the
integrity of its Trianon frontiers. In an attempt to keep Romania out of the orbit of
the Western Alliance Hitler re-approached Romania while letting Hungary know that
their aspirations with regard to Transylvania would not be forgotten.
In talks with Hitler in April of 1939, Teleki and Csáky indicated
that they were aware that Romania was of only of economic interest on the part of
Germany but for Hungary it was a political matter. Teleki was not just content to
have German support for its proposed territorial expansion at the expense of Romania
but also sought diplomatic support from Italy and England, Yugoslavia and Turkey. As
the crisis escalated in south-eastern Europe Teleki was involved in discussing
neutrality and non-aggression pacts between Hungary and Yugoslavia, Romania and
Bulgaria.
Hungary then sought a separate agreement with the government of
Yugoslavia in order to isolate Romania but the Yugoslavs refused to be part of it.
Hungarian threats directed against Romania intensified in the second half of August
1939. Teleki was convinced there would not be war over Poland but that the Great
Powers would call for a European Conference at which time Hungary would lay claim to
Transylvania. Romania engaged in partial mobilization and sent troops along the
Hungarian frontier while offering a non-aggression pact which Hungary of course turned
down. At a world forum and gathering Hungary undertook discussions with Romania with
regard to the protection of minority rights. It was obvious that the Hungarians
wanted the talks to fail and they did. With the outbreak of World War II over Poland,
Teleki’s plan came crashing down around his ears in terms of an independent policy for
Hungary and its “special” interests.
Hungary was without support for its revisionist policy and was
now the next door neighbour to the soon victorious Germans. With the occupation of
Poland and the apparent lack of power on the part of France and Britain, Horthy and
Teleki were taken totally surprise by the Hitler-Stalin Non Aggression Pact. Hungary
had allowed the passage of German troops through Hungary in September 1935 in the
Polish campaign. By providing this support Hungary hoped to be able to deal with
Romania with Nazi support. Now they thought these plans were in jeopardy.
All of this came to a crisis in June 1940 after the Western Front
had fallen and the USSR presented an ultimatum to Romania and demanded the annexation
of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina. When France fell in June 1940 Hitler
held power all across Europe. His attention was now directed to south-eastern
Europe. Hungary was now fully drawn into the orbit of the Nazi ideology and Hitler’s
policies from the period of 1938 to 1941 that resulted in the invasion of the USSR.
In the interim Hungary had “won back” southern Slovakia (1938); Carpatho-Ukraine
(1939); northern Transylvania (1940); and the areas incorporated from Yugoslavia
(1941).
After 1941 Hungary no longer had a foreign policy apart from that
of Germany. Hungary joined the Axis Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan on November 20,
1940. Teleki committed suicide in protest after Hungary’s occupation of “its”
Yugoslavian territories in April 1941 and then formally entered the war on June 27,
1941 on the side of Germany in the invasion of the USSR. This step led to the
intensification of the economic relations with the Reich and an acceptance of the Nazi
ideology especially with regard to anti-Semitism.
Horthy was an Anglophile and was not personally in sympathy with
Hitler or in favour of friendly relations with Germany when he joined the Axis. Of
greater significance to Horthy was the overwhelming power Hitler had all over Europe.
He wanted to march with the winners in the new world order under Hitler.
With the fall of France, Horthy’s anti-German stance up to 1938
changed. His regency emerged out the Counter Revolution and terror he led, which
destroyed Bela Kun’s Communist Republic and had allowed no Communist activity in
Hungary or any diplomatic relations with the USSR up until 1938. Earlier in 1936
Horthy warned Hitler about Stalin’s worldwide ambitions and goals and encouraged him
to destroy the Bolsheviks after he settled matters in the West. He wrote, “So long as
the Soviets are not defeated all of mankind is in great danger.” The establishment of
diplomatic relations with Russia in the fall of 1939 made little or no difference to
Horthy’s views. In the face of German ascendancy throughout all of south-eastern
Europe, Werth, the General Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army became very opposed to
what he saw was happening. He devised a plan that was in line with the Nazi ideology
but with his own special twist. All non-Magyar populations living in the territory of
Greater Hungary would be resettled in the “liberated territories” of the former Soviet
Union and provide living space for the Magyar people exclusively in his vision of
Greater Hungary. A racially pure Magyar nation: the hope and dream of Magyar
nationalists for centuries.
The native grown Fascist movements in the south-eastern European
States had the support and co-operation of the Nazi Party officials and the SS. Of
special importance were the Iron Guards in Romania and the Arrow Cross Party in
Hungary. Hitler’s attitude toward them differed from that of his underlings. As an
example, when the Iron Guards attempted to overthrow Marshal Antonescu in January 1941
it was Hitler who sided with the Marshal even though the SS supported the Iron Guards’
political ambitions. This led to confrontations between Himmler and Ribbentrop and
Hitler’s recall of the secret service units in Romania. It was a further example of
the way Hitler played off his subordinates against each other.
The more the Horthy government found itself in the vortex of
German power the greater were the changes in terms of the political and ideological
conditions in which they found themselves. There was a mass defection to the radical
right wing parties. This led to the militarization of life in Hungary. The military
took on more and more power under Werth and challenged the government. Despite
Horthy’s banning of the Arrow Cross Party and instituting police actions against them
they still had plenty of room to spread their hatred of the Jewish population and the
other minorities. They were chiefly responsible for the expulsion of several thousand
Jews in the Carpatho-Ukraine in August 1941 and June 1942 drove out three thousand
Jews and Serbs in Novi Sad killing many sadistically until they were restrained by the
local German army officials.
Hungary became more and more attached to Germany even though
Horthy resisted it. This dependence came to the fore during the first publicity
campaign carried out by the SS to recruit young men from the German minority into
their ranks at the beginning of 1942. Even though the government in Budapest was at
first unwilling to allow the Germans of Hungary serve in German units, they gave in as
the Nazi leadership insisted upon it. Because of the strong military support Romania
provided in the war against the Soviet Union, Hungary was also called upon for
military assistance even though Hungary had no territorial aspirations in the USSR as
Romania did in winning back its lost territories. Through his massive troop
commitment, Antonescu hoped to take back Bessarabia, the northern Bukovina and
northern Transylvania after a German victory. Werth criticized the Hungarian regime
for its reluctance to fight on the Soviet front. He affirmed Antonescu’s viewpoint
that the Axis Powers and their allies would share in the spoils of the war on the
basis of their involvement in the military campaign.
Despite the criticism from their own military the Hungarian
government now under Kállay backed out of active involvement in leading in the
military campaign against Russia in 1942, while on the other hand, Romania despite
tremendous losses in the winter of 1942-1943 fought alongside of the Germans until
August 23, 1944. As a result Hungary was in greater danger, as Antonescu could easily
begin a war with Hungary to regain Transylvania.
When Horthy sought to make peace with the advancing Red Army on
March 19, 1944 he was taken into custody and brought to Klessheim in Germany. Hitler
told him not to oppose the occupation of Hungary by German troops, otherwise it was
possible that Antonescu’s troops would invade Hungary and the nation’s territorial
integrity would be put into question.
As the German military reverses got worse, Horthy called for an
armistice ceasefire on October 15, 1944 and German troops occupied Hungary. Ferenz
Szalasi, the leader of the radical right wing Arrow Cross Party now headed the
government with the support of Germany but was unable to prevent the takeover and
occupation by the Red Army in the winter of.1944-1945.
All of this is but the political prelude that would affect the
fate of the German minority in Hungary in what will follow.
